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A Response to Lisa Heinzerling's Article “Five-Hundred 
Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate 




I am writing in response to Lisa Heinzerling's article “Five-Hundred 
Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over Regulatory 
Reform,”1 published in the Spring 2002 issue of Risk:  Health, Safety & 
Environment. Dr. Heinzerling comments on two papers that my colleagues 
and I, affiliated with the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, produced as 
part of research funded by the National Science Foundation over a decade 
ago.  The first is the article “Five-Hundred Lifesaving Interventions and 
Their Cost-Effectiveness,” published in the journal Risk Analysis in 1995.  
In this article we described the cost per year of lives saved of 587 interven-
tions that reduce the risk of premature death.  The second article is “The 
Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Societal Investments in Lifesaving” pub-
lished in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regu-
lation (R.W. Hahn ed., Oxford U. Press 1996).  In this chapter, we demon-
strated that by reallocating resources from interventions that are less cost-
effective to those that are more cost-effective, additional lives could be 
saved for the same money.  Dr. Heinzerling opines that these papers have 
“had a large influence on debates over health, safety, and environmental 
regulation.”  She then offers four criticisms of the papers and their subse-
quent public interpretation.  I address each of her concerns.  
First, Dr. Heinzerling notes that our papers “include many life-saving 
measures that have never been undertaken by anyone.”  Although she im-
plies that this is a flaw in our work, it is not.  There are smokers who do 
not receive cessation advice from their doctor, women who do not get an-
nual cervical cancer screening, and patients needing heart transplants who 
lack insurance.  It is nevertheless helpful to understand the cost-
effectiveness of these lifesaving measures.  In fact, in the quest to guide 
resource allocation decisions, it seems more useful to study the cost-
effectiveness of interventions that are not implemented, or only partially 
implemented, than those where the decision has already been made.  
  
 1. Lisa Heinzerling, Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over 
Regulatory Reform, 13 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment  151 (2002). 
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Dr. Heinzerling is especially critical of our estimates of the implemen-
tation of toxin control interventions saying, “for at least 59 of the 90 envi-
ronmental measures considered the authors assumed that the measures 
were at least partially implemented even though no agency ever required 
this.”2 The result, she fears, is that in the “Opportunity Cost” paper we 
hypothetically reallocated resources by taking “money from places where 
it was not being spent in order to produce artificial life-saving or money-
saving opportunities elsewhere.”3  In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Heinz-
erling makes the mistake of assuming that our assessment of the "imple-
mentation" of a toxin control “intervention” is defined by the presence of a 
regulation. 
Yet our research defines intervention more broadly than regulation.  
We measured the extent to which a toxin control intervention (e.g., best 
pollution-control technology at paper mills) was implemented by firms in a 
specific industrial setting, regardless of whether the intervention was com-
pelled by regulation.  Our estimates of the effectiveness and cost of spe-
cific interventions were often derived from formal regulatory impact 
analyses where numerous interventions were analyzed by an agency.  We 
then obtained implementation estimates for each of those interventions, 
regardless of whether they were ultimately required by regulation. Our 
method of obtaining estimates of the extent of implementation, expert 
elicitation, is not without its problems.  However, our basic research design 
does not depend on accurate assessments of whether a regulation has been 
adopted and/or upheld in the courts.  Dr. Heinzerling expresses disbelief 
that toxin control interventions might be implemented to some extent with-
out the compulsion of a regulation.  Yet it is well known that companies 
vary enormously in their approach to toxin-control issues:  some act to 
control toxin emissions well before federal rules are adopted, some await 
information about the specifics of a federal rule before they act, and some 
even wait for concrete enforcement actions before they make investments 
in toxin control.  Contrary to Heinzerling's implication, there is nothing in 
economic theory that predicts that all firms in an unregulated industry will 
approach toxin control decision-making in an identical manner.   
We estimated that 60,000 lives saved could be saved at no additional 
cost by reallocating resources from less cost-effective to more cost-
effective interventions.  This estimate was based on the 187 interventions 
that we analyzed, that subset of the 587 interventions for which total an-
nual cost and lifesaving information was available.  If we had access to 
data for a larger number of interventions, the 60,000 figure would neces-
  
 2. Id. at 159 (2002). 
 3. Id. 
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sarily have been larger.  We have no way of knowing whether the 187 ana-
lyzed interventions are representative of the universe of lifesaving inter-
ventions.  However, in fairness to our work, we note that at the time of 
publication the coverage of 187 interventions was the largest of any study 
in the literature.  While we may quibble about the exact size of the lifesav-
ing efficiency loss, it is obvious on the face of it that reallocating resources 
from less cost-effective to more cost-effective interventions could save 
more lives for the same monetary investment. 
In her second concern, Dr. Heinzerling suggests that our research is 
narrow because we do not consider the reallocation of resources spent on 
the B-2 bomber, leaf blowers, and cable television, or government subsi-
dies to the mining, logging, ranching and farming industries.  She is correct 
that we did not look at the reallocation across the entire U.S. economy.  
Such an ambitious effort would have been unwise from a scientific per-
spective, and thus her concern hardly seems a viable criticism.  Our inclu-
sion criteria were such that we included only lifesaving interventions, and 
only those select interventions for which we could find published cost and 
effectiveness data.  As a matter of policy advocacy, Dr. Heinzerling is enti-
tled to suggest that defense dollars should be reallocated to environmental 
protection.  Yet such a belief is not relevant to the validity of our research 
design or the interpretation of our results.  
Third, Dr. Heinzerling notes that our research ignores many of the non-
lifesaving benefits of regulation.  She reminds us of what others have 
pointed out before her, that because cancer deaths are easier to count, they 
are often the only health outcome considered in economic analyses of toxin 
control.  Because the original authors of the analyses we reviewed did not 
include these other effects, we too may be missing any respiratory, neuro-
logical, reproductive, and hematological risks caused by environmental 
toxins.  She implies, correctly, that environmental regulation would look 
much more cost-effective if reductions in these health problems were in-
cluded on the benefit side of the cost-benefit equation.  However, it is also 
true that if we had included the non-fatal injuries in addition to fatal inju-
ries averted by some interventions, then transportation risk reduction, oc-
cupational injury control, and consumer product safety would also look a 
lot more cost-effective.  In a similar vein, if we had included the morbidity 
and quality of life implications of disease, in addition to mortality conse-
quences, this would make medical treatments and population screening 
look a lot more cost-effective as well.  Thus, it is not immediately obvious 
that, relative to alternative ways of promoting health, environmental regu-
lation would look considerably more cost-effective if we had considered 
non-lifesaving health impacts.  
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Fourth, Dr. Heinzerling suggests that we “do not assume that all hu-
man lives endangered by human action are equally valuable.”4  Here, she 
criticizes our use of “years of life saved” as our measure of the lifesaving 
potential of each intervention, and suggests that this implies that an 
intervention “that saves the lives of the elderly is not as good as one that 
saves the lives of the young.”  Dr. Heinzerling apparently prefers the 
measure “lives saved” to “years of life saved” as a way of measuring 
effectiveness.  On the Harvard project we collected data on both.  Due to 
space limitations, the “Five-hundred” paper presents only estimates of 
cost/life-year saved but, as Dr. Heinzerling is aware, the “Opportunity 
Cost” paper presents both:  60,200 lives saved or 636,000 years of life 
saved at no additional cost.  
With that said, most cost-effectiveness analysts would disagree with 
Dr. Heinzerling about the wisdom of using “lives saved” as a measure of 
effectiveness.  This is because lives are never really “saved.”  We all have 
to go sometime – it's a just question of when; we can't prevent death – all 
we can do is affect its timing.  Given this, surely we prefer to live a longer 
life than a shorter life, hence “years of life” captures this innate preference.   
Further, in our papers we do not favor the elderly over the young as Dr. 
Heinzerling suggests, treating their lives as less valuable.  In our research, 
an intervention that extends the life of an elderly person by five years 
would be treated the same as one that extends the life of a young person by 
five years.  Of course, preventing the premature death of someone who will 
go on to live many years would be treated as preferable to preventing the 
death of someone who will live only a few more years.  Our intent, how-
ever, is to value more life-years over fewer life-years.  We practiced indif-
ference about whose life is being extended.    
Note also that it may not make sense to think of the young and the old 
as different groups of people in the sense that men and women, or blacks 
and whites, are different.  The young will become old.  Thus, preventing 
the death of a young person allows that person the opportunity to reach old 
age, benefiting both young and old over the life span.  
Dr. Heinzerling is also critical of our inclusion of time preference even 
though most economic analysts believe that discounting is prudent and 
essential.  Indeed, the U.S. Panel on Cost-effectiveness in Health and 
Medicine5 issued a series of recommendations on standards for rigorous 
cost-effectiveness analysis, calling for the discounting of both cost and 
effectiveness in economic analyses.  Failing to discount effectiveness 
would mean that we would be indifferent between saving lives now or in 
  
 4. Id. at 164. 
 5. Marthe R. Gold et al., Cost-Effectiveness in Health & Medicine (Oxford U. Press 1996). 
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the future.  Both would seem equally valuable.  The inevitable conclusion 
is thus that we might as well put off risk-reduction policies for two years, 
or ten years, or 100 years, or forever.  It is the failure to discount lives (or 
life-years), not the use of discounting, that leads to this perverse (and anti-
environmental) conclusion.  The incorporation of time preference recog-
nizes that, all things being equal, we prefer to save lives today over saving 
them tomorrow, thus postponing intervention is unwise.  
In the years since the Harvard Lifesaving papers were published, we 
have noticed that it is quite common for scholars to latch on to discounting 
as the culprit behind high cost-effectiveness ratios for toxin control inter-
ventions and Dr. Heinzerling, like those before her, seems to have made 
this assumption as well.  To be sure, discounting does affect the cost-
effectiveness ratio.  But the more important factor is that the potential risk 
reduction of some toxin control interventions (e.g., banning asbestos in 
vehicle clutch facings) is just plain small to begin with.  It is not unusual 
for a measure to avert one case of cancer every decade, for example.  Con-
trast that with what is known about the health gains from eating five fruits 
and vegetables a day, quitting smoking, or screening or colorectal cancer, 
and you can easily see why the cost-effectiveness of toxin control is often 
unfavorable in comparison.  
Finally, Dr. Heinzerling suggests that my co-author, John D. Graham, 
perpetuated and encouraged the misinterpretation of the results of these 
papers “in the service of an anti-regulatory agenda.”6 Heinzerling’s con-
cerns about Dr. Graham's public statements were thoroughly considered 
during his confirmation process before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs.  Indeed, Dr. Graham was forthright in answering all 
questions about his twenty years of writing and speaking on issues of pub-
lic health, safety and environmental regulation.  Interested readers can con-
sult the full hearing record at “Nominations of Angela B. Styles, Stephen 
A. Perry, and John D. Graham,” Hearing Before the Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, United States Senate, 107th Congress, First Session, 
May 17, 2001.  Further, for an objective journalistic account of Dr. Gra-
ham’s first year at OMB, I recommend that readers consult “The new ruler 
of rulemaking,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, February 23, 
2002, vol. 60 (8), pp. 520-526.  
 
Tammy O. Tengs, Sc.D.* 
 
  
 6. Heinzerling, supra n. 1, at 153. 
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